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作者：Dubois, Pierre; de Janvry, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the effects of the Mexican conditional cash transfer program Progresa on school enrollment and performance in passing grades. We develop a theoretical framework of the dynamics of the educational process including endogeneity and uncertainty of school performance. Using a randomized experiment implemented under Progresa, we identify the effect of the program on enrollment and performance in the first year of the program. We find that the program had a positive impact on school enrollm...
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作者：DeVaro, Jed; Waldman, Michael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：An extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability. We extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal-labor-market history of a medium-sized firm in the financial services industry. Our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences betwe...
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作者：Stinebrickner, Todd; Stinebrickner, Ralph
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Research examining the educational attainment of low-income students has often focused on financial factors such as credit constraints. We use unique longitudinal data to provide direct evidence about a prominent alternative explanation-that departures from school arise as students learn about their academic ability or grade performance. Examining college dropout, we find that this explanation plays a very prominent role; our simulations indicate that dropout between the first and second years...
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作者：Ishida, Junichiro
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This article explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents' incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and we then offer two distinct incentive schemes, fast track and late selection, to circumvent this problem. The present model offers a mechanism through which these ...
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作者：Bar, Talia; Kadiyali, Vrinda; Zussman, Asaf
作者单位：Cornell University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Concerns over grade inflation and disparities in grading practices have led institutions of higher education in the United States to adopt various grading reforms. An element common to several reforms is providing information on the distribution of grades in different courses. The main aims of such grades in context policies are to make grades more informative to transcript readers and to curb grade inflation. We provide a simple model to demonstrate that such policies can have complex effects...
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作者：Smith, Christopher L.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：The employment to population rate of high school-aged youth has fallen by about 20 percentage points since the late 1980s. One potential explanation is increased competition from substitutable labor, such as immigrants. I demonstrate that the increase in the population of less educated immigrants has had a considerably more negative effect on employment outcomes for native youth than for native adults. At least two factors are at work: there is greater overlap between the jobs that youth and l...
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作者：Glitz, Albrecht
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：With the fall of the Berlin Wall, ethnic Germans living in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were given the opportunity to migrate to Germany. Within 15 years, 2.8 million individuals had done so. Upon arrival, these immigrants were exogenously allocated to different regions to ensure an even distribution across the country. Their inflow can therefore be seen as a quasi-experiment of immigration. I analyze the effect of these inflows on skill-specific employment rates and wages. The r...
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作者：Herrmann, Mariesa A.; Rockoff, Jonah E.
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：A significant amount of work time is lost each year due to worker absence, but evidence on the productivity losses from absenteeism remains scant due to difficulties with identification. We use uniquely detailed data on the timing, duration, and cause of absences among teachers to address many of the potential biases from the endogeneity of worker absence. Our analysis indicates that worker absences have large negative impacts: the expected loss in daily productivity from employing a temporary...
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作者：Gayle, George-Levi; Golan, Limor; Miller, Robert A.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for executive rank and background, that women earn higher compensation than men, experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Among survivors, being female increases the chance of becom...
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作者：Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Wibral, Matthias
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Bonn
摘要：Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. We analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments. In our two main treatments, we compare a two-stage tournament to a one-stage tournament. Subjects in the two-stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage, both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Additional control treatments confirm that excess ...
