Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gayle, George-Levi; Golan, Limor; Miller, Robert A.
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/666615
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 829-871
• 关键词: managerial compensation; internal economics; personnel data; moral hazard; gap; firm; DISCRIMINATION; promotion

摘要

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for executive rank and background, that women earn higher compensation than men, experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Among survivors, being female increases the chance of becoming chief executive officer. The unconditional gender pay gap and job-rank differences are primarily attributable to female executives exiting the occupation at higher rates than men.