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作者:Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Macleod, W. Bentley
作者单位:University of Bonn; University of Oxford; Columbia University
摘要:We conduct laboratory experiments where the market rules mimic labor market institutions and exogenously vary institutions to study the causal impact on subjects' behaviors. We focus on rules analogous to dismissal barrier institutions, such as employment protection legislation, and on institutions allowing bonus pay. We find that when constrained to fixed wage contracts, dismissal barriers reduce efficiency but parties react by evolving rising compensation profiles. When the option to pay bon...
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作者:Freeman, Richard B.; Huang, Wei
作者单位:Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:By examining the ethnic identity of authors in over 2.5 million scientific papers written by US-based authors from 1985 to 2008, we find that persons of similar ethnicity coauthor together more frequently than predicted by their proportion among authors. The greater homophily is associated with publication in lower-impact journals and with fewer citations. Meanwhile, papers with authors in more locations and with longer reference lists get published in higher-impact journals and receive more c...
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作者:Kerr, Sari Pekkala; Kerr, William R.; Lincoln, William F.
作者单位:Wellesley College; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Johns Hopkins University
摘要:We study the impact of skilled immigrants on the employment structures of US firms using matched employer-employee data. Unlike most previous work, we use the firm as the lens of analysis to account for greater heterogeneity and the fact that many skilled immigrant admissions are driven by firms themselves (e.g., the H-1B visa). OLS and IV specifications show rising overall employment of skilled workers with increased skilled immigrant employment by the firm. Employment expansion is greater fo...
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作者:Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; Harvard University
摘要:We combine unique administrative and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data include manager characteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial practices, and outcomes for the firm and the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentives generates implications that we test with our data. We use the model to illustrate how risk aversion and talent determine how firms select and motivate managers. We show that empirical links between firm g...
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作者:Prendergast, Canice
作者单位:University of Chicago
摘要:Employees in public agencies rarely have pay for performance: instead their incentives are often guided by a sense of professionalism. This paper concerns how organizations should monitor professionals. The primary outcome of the paper is that weak incentives lead public agencies to exhibit bias in their oversight, by rewarding the interests of their employees to the detriment of other constituencies' concerns. In some instances, this bias is complete by entirely ignoring other interests.
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作者:Mansfield, Richard K.
作者单位:Cornell University
摘要:This paper uses 11 years of administrative data from North Carolina public high schools to examine the extent to which the allocation of teachers within and across public high schools is contributing to inequality in student test score performance. The existence of nearly 3,500 teacher transfers allows separate identification of each teacher's quality from other school-level factors. I find that teaching quality is fairly equitably distributed both within and across high schools: students amon...
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作者:Stafford, Tess M.
作者单位:University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要:Recent empirical findings have cast doubt on the neoclassical model of labor supply. However, estimation issues, and not workers' behavior, may be responsible for these findings. This paper investigates this possibility by examining the daily labor supply of Florida lobster fishermen. I invariably find that fishermen work more when earnings are temporarily high, behavior that is consistent with a neoclassical model of labor supply. Furthermore, methods that do not control for measurement error...