Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bandiera, Oriana; Guiso, Luigi; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/679672
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 623-681
• 关键词: corporate-ownership; performance pay; Family firms; trade-off; RISK; MARKET; PRODUCTIVITY; size; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION

摘要

We combine unique administrative and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data include manager characteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial practices, and outcomes for the firm and the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentives generates implications that we test with our data. We use the model to illustrate how risk aversion and talent determine how firms select and motivate managers. We show that empirical links between firm governance, incentives, and performance, which have so far been studied in isolation, can instead all be interpreted within our simple unified matching framework.