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作者：Stewart, Mark B.
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper uses longitudinal data from three contrasting data sets (matched Labor Force Surveys, the British Household Panel Survey, and matched New Earnings Surveys) to estimate the impact of the introduction of the U.K. minimum wage (in April 1999) on the probability of subsequent employment among those whose wages would have needed to be raised to comply with the minimum. A difference-in-differences estimator is used, based on position in the wage distribution. No significant adverse employ...
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作者：Brunnermeier, Markus K.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：This paper provides a theoretical rationale for three experimental results of Prospect Theory: risk preferences are over gains and losses, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. We consider a (boundedly rational) decision maker who does not find her new optimal consumption bundle with certainty when she is faced with a new income level. This alters her indirect utility function and makes her more risk averse at her current reference income level and less risk averse for a range of incomes...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the democratic peace hypothesis (i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another). We show that, when information asymmetries and strategic complements are present in the conflict resolution game, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from that of any other dyad. In our model, the interaction of two democracies produces the highest probability that a conflict will be peacefully resolved. But, it takes two dem...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Rey, Patrick; Dewatripont, Mathias
作者单位：Harvard University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to...
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作者：Ellison, Glenn; Moebius, Markus; Fudenberg, Drew
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)
