COMPETING AUCTIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ellison, Glenn; Moebius, Markus; Fudenberg, Drew
署名单位：
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247604323015472
发表日期：
2004
关键词：
摘要：
This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)
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