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作者：Gorton, Gary; Schmid, Frank A.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：Under the German corporate governance system of codetermination, employees are legally allocated control rights over corporate assets through seats on the supervisory board-that is, the board of nonexecutive directors. The supervisory board oversees the management board-the board of executive directors-approves or rejects its decisions, and appoints its members and sets their salaries. We empirically investigate the implications of this sort of labor participation in corporate decision making....
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作者：Fehr, Ernst; List, John A.
作者单位：University of Zurich; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students-thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit thre...
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作者：Maskin, Eric
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作者：Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper presents a theory of political competition with campaign contributions and informative political advertising. Policy-motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like-minded candidates. Contributions are used to finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates' ideologies. Voters update their beliefs rationally given the information they have received. The paper us...
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作者：Mas-Colell, Andreu
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
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作者：Olofsgard, Anders
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper shows that an uninformed player can increase his bargaining power by committing to receive information from an expert more skeptical to cooperation. This general idea is applied to a model in which a regional political leader (the expert) influences voting in a referendum on independence by strategically disseminating information about the consequences of separation. I show that this motivates a moderate electorate to appoint a more extreme leader, to receive biased information that...
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作者：Falconieri, Sonia; Palomino, Frederic; Sakovics, Jozsef
作者单位：Tilburg University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Edinburgh
摘要：In many countries, the collective sale of television rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities. In several cases, however, the leagues won in court, on the ground that sport is not a standard good. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of television rights collectively by sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare point of view. We find that collective sale is socially preferable when (a) lea...
