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作者：Adao, Bernardino; Teles, Pedro; Correia, Isabel
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study environments with sticky prices, wages, or portfolios where it is feasible and optimal to use monetary policy to replicate the allocation under full flexibility. In these environments the optimal policy does not depend on the scope of the frictions. In this sense, the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism is irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy. So, asymmetries in the strength of the transmission mechanisms do not impose a cost on a common policy. (JEL: E31, E41, E5...
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作者：Hanushek, Eric A.; Raymond, Margaret E.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The use of school accountability in the United States to improve student performance began in the separate states during the 1980s and was elevated through the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Evaluating the impact of accountability is difficult because it applies to entire states and can be confused with other changes in the states. We consider how the differential introduction of accountability across states affects growth in student performance on the National Assessment of Educati...
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作者：Ljungqvist, Lars; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University
摘要：We recalibrate den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey's matching model to incorporate our preferred specification of turbulence as causing distinct dynamics of human capital after voluntary and involuntary job losses. Under our calibration, with high unemployment benefits, an increase in turbulence increases the unemployment rate and the duration of unemployment while leaving the inflow rate into unemployment roughly unchanged, mirroring features of European data in the 1980s and 1990s. The essential iss...
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作者：Olofsgard, Anders
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper shows that an uninformed player can increase his bargaining power by committing to receive information from an expert more skeptical to cooperation. This general idea is applied to a model in which a regional political leader (the expert) influences voting in a referendum on independence by strategically disseminating information about the consequences of separation. I show that this motivates a moderate electorate to appoint a more extreme leader, to receive biased information that...
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作者：Fecht, Falko
作者单位：Deutsche Bundesbank
摘要：An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond and Dybvig style and a financial market coexist is modeled in a simple framework closely related to Diamond (1997). Solely depending on the fraction of naive households who cannot efficiently invest directly in the corporate sector, two different types of financial systems emerge. With the fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented, whereas a high fraction brings about a bank-dominated fi...
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作者：Falconieri, Sonia; Palomino, Frederic; Sakovics, Jozsef
作者单位：Tilburg University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Edinburgh
摘要：In many countries, the collective sale of television rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities. In several cases, however, the leagues won in court, on the ground that sport is not a standard good. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of television rights collectively by sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare point of view. We find that collective sale is socially preferable when (a) lea...
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作者：Cingano, Federico; Schivardi, Fabiano
作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
摘要：Using firm-level based TFP indicators (as opposed to employment-based proxies) we estimate the effects of alternative sources of dynamic externalities at the local level. In contrast to previous empirical work, we find that industrial specialization and scale indicators affect TFP growth positively, while neither product variety nor the degree of local competition have any effect. Employment-based regressions yield nearly the opposite results, in line with most of previous empirical work. We a...
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作者：Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; University College London
摘要：Ascending auctions offer agents the option to wait and see before deciding to drop out. We show that in contexts where as time proceeds agents get finer and finer estimates of their valuations, incentives to drop out at one's expected valuation are weak: it is optimal for agents to wait and see. We first illustrate the claim in a private value setting. We next analyze an interdependent value setting in which this wait and see option results in an imperfect information aggregation. We also anal...
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作者：Uhlig, Harald
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Tilburg University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper contributes to the debate initiated by Gali in 1999. I provide a theory with capital income taxation, labor hoarding as well as long-run shifts in the social attitudes to the workplace-modelled as leisure at the workplace-to argue that there are other shocks that may influence labor productivity in the long run. I introduce medium-run identification and show it to be superior to long-run identification or standard short-run identification, when applied to artificial data. With U.S. ...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Rey, Patrick; Dewatripont, Mathias
作者单位：Harvard University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to...
