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作者：Pettersson-Lidbom, Per
作者单位：Stockholm University
摘要：A long-standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies. This question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities. This article uses a regression-discontinuity design, namely, party control changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote share, which can produce near experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes....
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作者：Alesina, Alberto; Campante, Filipe R.; Tabellini, Guido
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to starve the Leviathan to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this ...
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作者：Ortega, Javier; Tangeras, Thomas P.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We consider an economy with two language groups, where only agents who share a language can produce together. Schooling enhances the productivity of students. Individuals attending a unilingual school end up speaking the language of instruction only, whereas bilingual schools render individuals bilingual at the same cost. The politically dominant group ( not necessarily the majority) chooses the type(s) of schools accessible to each language group, and then individuals decide whether to attend...
