Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Alesina, Alberto; Campante, Filipe R.; Tabellini, Guido
署名单位：
Harvard University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.5.1006
发表日期：
2008
页码：
1006-1036
关键词：
摘要：
Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to starve the Leviathan to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies.
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