Central Banks as Dollar Lenders of Last Resort: Implications for Regulation and Reserve HoldingsIndian Rupee

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Das, Mitali; Gopinath, Gita; Hall, Helene; Kim, Taehoon; Stein, Jeremy c.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20240107
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: International reserves; financial crises; exchange-rate; precautionary; management; TRADE

摘要

We explore how foreign central banks behave when firms engage in currency mismatch, borrowing heavily in dollars. A central bank can deal with risky private-sector mismatch in two ways: (i) with financial regulation or (ii) by accumulating reserves to better serve as a dollar lender of last resort. We highlight a novel externality: Individual central banks may overaccumulate dollar reserves, as this exacerbates a global scarcity of dollar-denominated assets, lowering dollar interest rates and encouraging firms to further increase their currency mismatch. Relative to the decentralized outcome, a global planner may prefer tighter financial regulation and reduced holdings of dollar reserves. (JEL E43, E44, E58, F31, F41, G21, G28)