Training, Communications Patterns, and Spillovers inside Organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Espinosa, Miguel; Stanton, Christopher
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/740219
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: division-of-labor; flattening firm; INEQUALITY; MARKET; specialization; investments; hierarchies; incentives; KNOWLEDGE; selection

摘要

This paper examines how training affects productivity across hierarchical layers within organizations. After a randomized training program for frontline employees at a government agency, trained workers' output increased while their requests for managerial assistance fell. This freed managers to focus on strategic tasks-particularly managers with the strongest connections to trained employees. A structural model of organizational hierarchy shows that spillovers to managers account for approximately 45% of the program's total benefits, indicating that evaluations focused solely on individual trainees may substantially understate the full value of training investments.