The Gas Trap: Outcompeting Coal versus Renewables

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harstad, Bard; Holtsmark, Katinka
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/740172
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: electricity demand; Price elasticity; natural-gas; FUEL PRICES; solar pv; POLICY; inconsistency; COOPERATION; impacts; taxes

摘要

We analyze a fundamental dilemma and time-inconsistency problem facing climate-concerned producers of natural gas. In the short term, it is tempting to produce more to outcompete coal. When this policy is anticipated, however, investments in renewables fall and emissions may ultimately increase. When the gas producers cannot precommit, their policies can be counterproductive. A simulated version applied to Europe verifies that the gas trap is quantitatively important. We discuss the robustness of this result and possible solutions, ranging from direct investments in renewables to taxes on the search and exploration of gas.