Accountability and Coalitions: Evidence from a Negotiation Experiment

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Bouwman, Robin; van Thiel, Sandra; van Deemen, Ad; Rouwette, Etienne
署名单位:
Radboud University Nijmegen; Radboud University Nijmegen; Radboud University Nijmegen; Radboud University Nijmegen; Radboud University Nijmegen
刊物名称:
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0033-3352
DOI:
10.1111/puar.12858
发表日期:
2018
页码:
37-47
关键词:
public-service motivation Time pressure sector networks constituents context LABOR work
摘要:
This article tests the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes in a face-to-face classroom experiment. Student participants were asked to form coalitions in groups of three. In the treatment condition, negotiators were held accountable by a personal forum during the formation of the coalition. In the control condition, negotiators were not held accountable. Results show that accountability leads to lower group performance in coalition negotiations. Accountability also reduced the willingness of negotiators to include all negotiators in a grand coalition. Rather, accountable negotiators reached agreement with a subset of negotiators. Accountability increased the odds of reaching no agreement. These findings challenge the idea of increased performance as a result of public accountability in the context of coalition negotiations.