Information policy: Shaping the value of agency relationships

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Jacobides, MG; Croson, DC
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2001.4378014
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 202-223
• 关键词: incentive contracts; moral hazard; COSTS; OWNERSHIP; PRODUCTIVITY; ORGANIZATION; TECHNOLOGY; adaptation; management; provision

摘要

We evaluate how changes in information use affect agency relationships. Information asymmetry redistributes value, but imperfect monitoring also encourages agents to take inefficient actions to influence this redistribution. thereby reducing joint agency value. Changing focus. from minimizing principals' costs to maximizing joint agency value, we argue that more monitoring is not always better, and we explore, through a six-sector framework. how more extensive use of information benefits (or damages) value creation and affects its distribution.