Deregulatory forms, variations in the speed of governance adaptation, and firm performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, B; Prescott, JE
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.2307/20159127
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 414-425
• 关键词: board composition; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; GROWTH; CHOICE

摘要

Government regulation in an industry is an intermediary in the principal-agent relationship that acts as a substitute for internal governance mechanisms. We propose a model for studying how different forms of deregulation (frame-breaking, metamorphic, piecemeal, and plodding) impact variations in the speed of adaptation of internal governance mechanisms to the theoretical predictions of agency theory and resulting performance implications. We develop illustrative propositions for a set of contingencies that moderate the above relationship. How government and firms manage the deregulatory process has important economic and social consequences.