Government corruption and the entry strategies of multinationals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rodriguez, P; Uhlenbruck, K; Eden, L
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; University of Montana System; University of Montana; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2005.16387894
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 383-396
• 关键词: INTERNATIONAL ENTRY; Isomorphism; CHOICE; mode; INVESTMENT; SUBSIDIARY; legitimacy; advantage; ambiguity; BEHAVIOR

摘要

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) often encounter government corruption when operating in host countries; however, in the international management literature, it is typically assumed that government officials pursue national interests rather than their own. We introduce a two-dimensional framework to further the understanding of public sector corruption and identify its implications for MNEs. Using an institutional perspective, we examine how the pervasiveness and arbitrariness of corruption can affect an MNE's organizational legitimacy and strategic decision making. We apply our analysis to the mode of entry decision.