Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tenbrunsel, AE; Messick, DM
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8392
• DOI: 10.2307/2667052
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 684-707
• 关键词: behavior; ORGANIZATIONS; SURVEILLANCE; incentives; discipline; OWNERSHIP; dilemmas; rewards; work; firm

摘要

Three studies are used to examine how surveillance and sanctioning systems affect cooperative behavior in dilemma situations. The first two studies demonstrate that a weak sanctioning system results in less cooperation than no sanctioning system; furthermore, results from the second study suggest that sanctions affect the type of decision people perceive they are making, prompting them to see it as a business rather than an ethical decision. The results from these studies are used to develop a theoretical model that postulates that the relationship between sanctions and cooperation is due to both a signaling effect, in which sanctions influence the type of decision that is perceived to be made, and a processing effect, in which the decision processing, including whether or not the strength of the sanction is considered, depends on the decision frame evoked. A third study provides support for the processing-effect hypothesis.