DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS: EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF FRAMING AND EXPECTATIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weber, Libby; Mayer, Kyle J.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/amr.2008.0270
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 53-75
• 关键词: long-term-contracts; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS; REGULATORY FOCUS; EMPIRICAL-RESEARCH; price adjustment; performance; Embeddedness; prevention; motivation; promotion

摘要

How a contract influences the exchange and ongoing relationship between parties is an unresolved issue. While some suggest contracts negatively or positively influence the exchange and relationship, we argue that the contract frame determines its impact. Using regulatory focus and expectancy violation theories, we argue that promotion- and prevention-framed contracts induce different emotions, behaviors, and expectations, leading to different exchange outcomes and relationships, depending on the context. By considering contract framing, we provide new research opportunities in areas that use contracts to achieve desired outcomes.