The Best of Both Worlds: The Benefits of Open-specialized and Closed-diverse Syndication Networks for New Ventures' Success

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ter Wal, Anne L. J.; Alexy, Oliver; Block, Joern; Sandner, Philipp G.
• 署名单位: Imperial College London; Technical University of Munich; Universitat Trier; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Technical University of Munich
• 刊物名称: ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-8392
• DOI: 10.1177/0001839216637849
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 393-432
• 关键词: STRUCTURAL HOLES; social networks; INITIAL NETWORK; performance; KNOWLEDGE; INNOVATION; INVESTMENT; Brokerage; search; TIES

摘要

Open networks give actors non-redundant information that is diverse, while closed networks offer redundant information that is easier to interpret. Integrating arguments about network structure and the similarity of actors' knowledge, we propose two types of network configurations that combine diversity and ease of interpretation. Closed-diverse networks offer diversity in actors' knowledge domains and shared third-party ties to help in interpreting that knowledge. In open-specialized networks, structural holes offer diversity, while shared interpretive schema and overlap between received information and actors' prior knowledge help in interpreting new information without the help of third parties. In contrast, actors in open-diverse networks suffer from information overload due to the lack of shared schema or overlapping prior knowledge for the interpretation of diverse information, and actors in closed-specialized networks suffer from overembeddedness because they cannot access diverse information. Using CrunchBase data on early-stage venture capital investments in the U.S. information technology sector, we test the effect of investors' social capital on the success of their portfolio ventures. We find that ventures have the highest chances of success if their syndicating investors have either open-specialized or closed-diverse networks. These effects are manifested beyond the direct effects of ventures' or investors' quality and are robust to controlling for the possibility that certain investors could have chosen more promising ventures at the time of first funding.