FORBEARANCE: STRATEGIC NONRESPONSE TO COMPETITIVE ATTACKS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andrevski, Goce; Miller, Danny
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0363-7425
• DOI: 10.5465/amr.2018.0248
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 59-74
• 关键词: real options; responses; performance; DYNAMICS; BEHAVIOR; PERSPECTIVE; TECHNOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGY; networks; OMISSION

摘要

Evidence suggests that firms often do not respond even when they are aware of an attack and have the capability to counter it. We believe that this is because they engage in a form of nonresponse that we designate as strategic forbearance, a phenomenon that has been mostly neglected by scholars of competitive dynamics. We view such forbearance as a critical component of competitive strategy-an attempt to situate responses to attacks within a more complex and nuanced strategic, organizational, and environmental context. Forbearance, we argue, represents managers' mindful attempts to transcend reflexive responses by expanding the range of considerations beyond (a) an attacker to other stakeholders and rivals, (b) the immediate attack to its historical setting and long-term relational implications, and (c) unitary tactics to those concerning global strategic coherence and adaptation. We formally define and tentatively operationalize strategic forbearance before deriving propositions concerning its five general transcending drivers. Ultimately, we believe that the study of forbearance can bring scholars of competitive dynamics closer to the heart of reflective competitive strategy.