Political bias and war

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jackson, Matthew O.; Morelli, Massimo
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1353
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1353-1373
• 关键词: RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS; CONFLICT; incentives; leaders

摘要

We examine how countries' incentives to go to war depend on the political bias of their pivotal decision makers. This bias is measured by a decision maker's risk/reward ratio from a war compared to that of the country at large. If there is no political bias, then there are mutually acceptable transfers from one country to the other that will avoid a war in the presence of commitment or enforceability of peace treaties. There are cases with a strong enough bias on the part of one or both countries where war cannot be prevented by any transfer payments. Our results shed some new light on the uneven contender paradox and the interpretation of the democratic peace. We examine countries' choices of the bias of their leaders and show that when transfers are possible, at least one country will choose a biased leader, as that leads to a strong bargaining position and extraction of transfers.