A political-economy theory of trade agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maggi, Giovanni; Rodriguez-Clare, Andris
• 署名单位: Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1374
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1374-1406
• 关键词: organization; gradualism; Tariff

摘要

We present a model where trade agreements are motivated by the desire of governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic lobbies, in addition to standard terms-of-trade externalities. The model predicts that trade liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile across sectors, and when governments are more politically motivated (provided domestic-commitment motives are strong enough). The model also provides a new rationale for the use of tariff ceilings. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, tariffs are reduced in two stages: an immediate cut and a subsequent gradual reduction, with the speed of liberalization increasing in the degree of capital mobility.