Marking to Market versus Taking to Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Plantin, Guillaume; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161749
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2246-2276
• 关键词: TO-MARKET; auctions; equilibrium; liquidity; entry

摘要

Building Of the idea that accounting matters for corporate governance, this paper studies the equilibrium interaction between the measurement rules that firms find privately optimal, firms' governance, and the liquidity in the secondary market for their assets. This equilibrium approach reveals an excessive use of market-value accounting: corporate performance measures rely excessively on the information generated by other firms' asset sales and insufficiently on the realization of a firm's own capital gains. This dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals, thereby making it more costly for firms to overcome their agency problems.