Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina; Yared, Pierre
• 署名单位: Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151180
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2305-2334
• 关键词: NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH-MODEL; optimal delegation; political-economy; monetary-policy; current account; stock-market; self-control; public debt; equilibrium; GOVERNMENT

摘要

Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare coordinated rules, chosen jointly by a group of countries, to uncoordinated rules. If governments' present bias is small, coordinated rules are tighter than uncoordinated rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, coordinated rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits enhance welfare, and increased savings by some countries or outside economies can hurt the rest.