Consumers as Tax Auditors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Naritomi, Joana
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160658
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3031-3072
• 关键词: taxation; revenue; evasion; REFORM; FIRMS

摘要

To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent.