Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sanktjohanser, Anna
署名单位：
Yale University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20161491
发表日期：
2020
页码：
776-796
关键词：
摘要：
I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self- interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms' actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria exist. Second, collusive equilibria are monitor-preferred. Third, in monitor-preferred equilibria, firms' payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor. My model helps explain cartel agreements between self-interested parties and firms in legal industries in the United States and Europe.