Job Matching under Constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kojima, Fuhito; Sun, Ning; Yu, Ning Neil
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Nanjing Audit University; Nanjing Audit University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190780
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2935-2947
• 关键词: college admissions; gross substitutes; school choice; STABILITY; equilibrium; incentives; mechanisms; auctions

摘要

Studying job matching in a Kelso-Crawford framework, we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on sets of doctors that a hospital can hire. We characterize all constraints that preserve the substitutes condition (for all revenue fiaictions that satisfy the substitutes condition), a critical condition on hospitals' revenue functions for well-behaved competitive equilibria. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a generalized interval constraint, which specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of hired doctors, forces some hires, and forbids others. Additionally, generalized polyhedral constraints are precisely those that preserve the substitutes condition for all group separable revenue functions.