A Model of Complex Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jakobsen, Alexander M.
• 署名单位: University of Calgary
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190283
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1243-1273
• 关键词: Mechanism design; players models

摘要

I study a mechanism design problem involving a principal and a single, boundedly rational agent. The agent transitions among belief states by combining current beliefs with up to K pieces of information at a time. By expressing a mechanism as a complex contract- a collection of clauses, each providing limited information about the mechanism the principal manipulates the agent into believing truthful reporting is optimal. I show that such bounded rationality expands the set of implementable functions and that optimal contracts are robust not only to variation in K, but to several plausible variations on the agent's cognitive procedure.