Why Special Economic Zones? Using Trade Policy to Discriminate across Importers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grant, Matthew
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180384
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1540-1571
• 关键词: protection; unemployment; COMPETITION; POLITICS; wars

摘要

Tariffs are generally assumed to depend on the product, not the identity of the importer. However, special economic zones are a common, economically important policy used worldwide to lower tariffs on selected goods for selected manufacturers. I show this is motivated by policymakers' desire to discriminate across buyers when a tax is intended to raise prices for sellers, through a mechanism distinct from existing theories of optimal taxation. Using a new dataset compiled from public records and exogenous changes in imports of intermediate goods, I find the form, composition, and size of US zones are consistent with the theory.