Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting. Selection. and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Davenport, Edward; Lee, Scott S.
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180326
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1355-1394
• 关键词: field experiment; performance pay; health-care; incentives; community; ECONOMICS; teachers; IDENTITY

摘要

We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new' health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.