Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina; Kremer, Ilan; Winter, Eyal
• 署名单位: Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190234
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 889-921
• 关键词: increasing risk; COORDINATION

摘要

A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers payments contingent on success. We study the firm's optimal -unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the firm the maximum payoff. This scheme treats investors differently based on size. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is -log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm's payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality.