Team-Specific Human Capital and Team Performance: Evidence from Doctors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yiqun
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201238
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3923-3962
• 关键词: MORAL HAZARD EVIDENCE; incentives; INFORMATION; outcomes; Heterogeneity; PRODUCTIVITY; experience; CONTRACTS; QUALITY; rates

摘要

This paper studies whether team members' past collaboration creates team-specific human capital and influences current team performance. Using administrative Medicare claims for two heart procedures, I find that shared work experience between the doctor who performs the procedure (proceduralist) and the doctors who provide care to the patient during the hospital stay for the procedure (physicians) reduces patient mortality rates. A one standard deviation increase in proceduralist-physician shared work experience leads to a 10-14 percent reduction in patient 30-day mortality. Patient medical resource use also declines with shared work experience, even as survival improves.