Politically Feasible Reforms of Nonlinear Tax Systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bierbrauer, Felix J.; Boyer, Pierre C.; Peichl, Andreas
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer20190021
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 153-191
• 关键词: Capital taxation; social-mobility; taxable income; UNITED-STATES; welfare; preferences; rates; COMPETITION; MODEL

摘要

We study reforms of nonlinear income tax systems from a political economy perspective. We present a median voter theorem for monotonic tax reforms, reforms so that the change in the tax burden is a monotonic function of income. We also provide an empirical analysis of tax reforms, with a focus on the United States. We show that past reforms have, by and large, been monotonic. We also show that support by the median voter was aligned with majority support in the population. Finally, we develop sufficient statistics that enable to test whether a given tax system admits a politically feasible reform.