Delegation in Veto Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartik, Navin; Kleiner, Andreas; Van Weelden, Richard
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201817
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 4046-4087
• 关键词: resource-allocation; FORMAL MODEL; settings; DESIGN

摘要

A proposer requires a veto player's approval to change a status quo. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's preferences. We show that Vetoer is typically given a non-singleton menu, or delegation set, of options to pick from. The optimal set balances the extent of compromise with the risk of a veto. We identify conditions for certain delegation sets to emerge, including full delegation: Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer's ideal action. By contrast to expertise-based delegation, Proposer gives less discretion to Vetoer when their preferences are more (likely to be) aligned.