From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gratton, Gabriele; Guiso, Luigi; Michelacci, Claudio; Morelli, Massimo
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190672
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2964-3003
• 关键词: Incentives; bureaucrats; ELECTIONS; rules

摘要

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency.