M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goeree, Jacob K.; Louis, Philippos
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201683
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 4002-4045
• 关键词: STATIONARY CONCEPTS; stated beliefs; players models; human-behavior; 2X2 GAMES; thinking; unique; preferences; strategies; cognition

摘要

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models.