Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysist

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kong, Yunmi; Perrigne, Isabelle; Vuong, Quang
• 署名单位: Rice University; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1703-1736
• 关键词: structural-analysis; 1st-price auctions; semiparametric estimation; nonparametric-estimation; procurement; COMPETITION; INFORMATION; securities; QUALITY; options

摘要

In this paper, we conduct a structural analysis of multi-attribute auctions of contracts with a general allocation rule when private information is multidimensional. Upon modeling bidders' contract value that accounts for their endogenous ex post actions, we nonparametrically identify bidders' private information from their bids and estimate their joint distribution. Analyzing cash-royalty auctions of Louisiana oil leases, we find government revenue worse and development rates no better than in a cash auction with a fixed royalty in view of adverse selection and moral hazard. Our findings revise conventional wisdom on the optimality of multi-attribute auctions.