Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Battaglini, Marco; Harstad, Bard
• 署名单位: Cornell University; University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/684478
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 160-204
• 关键词: public-goods; INEFFICIENCY; strategies; provision; CONTRACTS; STABILITY; game

摘要

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problemassociated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate. If investments are noncontractible, countries face a holdup problemevery time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that circumvent the holdup problem. Under well-specified conditions even the first-best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete.