Teamwork and Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Emergency Department

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chan, David C.
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/685910
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 734-770
• 关键词: resource management-practices; personnel data; ORGANIZATIONS; PRODUCTIVITY; incentives; INFORMATION; firm; performance; authority; teams

摘要

I investigate how teamwork may reduce moral hazard by joint monitoring and management. I study two organizational systems differing in the extent to which physicians may mutually manage work: Physicians are assigned patients in a nurse-managed system but divide patients between themselves in a self-managed system. The self-managed system increases throughput productivity by reducing a foot-dragging moral hazard, in which physicians prolong patient stays as expected future work increases. I find evidence that physicians in the same location have better information about each other and that, in the self-managed system, they use this information to assign patients.