THE ROLE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maggi, Giovanni; Staiger, Robert W.
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjq005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 475-515
• 关键词: LAW; EVOLUTION

摘要

Although disputes are typically treated as synonymous with concerns about enforcement in economic models of trade agreements, in reality most WTO disputes seem to concern the interpretation of vague provisions, or instances where the agreement is silent. And some have suggested that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) could usefully grant exceptions to rigid contractual obligations. These activist DSB roles could help complete an incomplete contract. But how activist should the DSB be? Should DSB rulings set precedent? We address these questions by characterizing the optimal choice of contract form and DSB mandate under various contracting conditions. JEL Codes: D02, D78, D86, F13, K12, K33.