FINANCIAL CONTRACTING UNDER IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellingsen, Tore; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjq006
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 323-371
• 关键词: OPTIMAL SECURITY DESIGN; capital structure; corporate governance; Investor protection; Agency problems; continuous-time; equity; debt; LAW; intermediation

摘要

We develop a model of financial contracting under imperfect enforcement. Financial contracts are designed to keep entrepreneurs from diverting project returns, but enforcement is probabilistic and penalties are limited. The model rationalizes the prevalence of straight debt and common stock, and its predictions are consistent with a host of empirical capital structure regularities. JEL Codes: G32.