GROWTH IN THE SHADOW OF EXPROPRIATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aguiar, Mark; Amador, Manuel
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjr015
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 651-697
• 关键词: sovereign debt; interest-rates; optimal taxes; CAPITAL FLOW; INVESTMENT; COMMITMENT; POLICY; MODEL; aid; institutions

摘要

We propose a tractable variant of the open economy neoclassical growth model that emphasizes political economy and contracting frictions. The political economy frictions involve a preference for immediate spending, while the contracting friction is a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt and expropriation. We show that the political economy frictions slow an economy's convergence to the steady state due to the endogenous evolution of capital taxation. The model rationalizes why openness has different implications for growth depending on the political environment, why institutions such as the treatment of capital income evolve over time, why governments in countries that grow rapidly accumulate net foreign assets rather than liabilities, and why foreign aid may not affect growth.