SPENDING-BIASED LEGISLATORS: DISCIPLINE THROUGH DISAGREEMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piguillem, Facundo; Riboni, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjv011
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 901-949
• 关键词: dynamic theory; equilibrium; POLICY; INEFFICIENCY

摘要

We study legislators who have a present bias for spending: they want to increase current spending and procrastinate spending cuts. We show that disagreement in legislatures can lead to policy persistence that attenuates the temptation to overspend. Depending on the environment, legislators' decisions to be fiscally responsible may either complement or substitute other legislators' decisions. When legislators have low discount factors, their actions are strategic complements. Thus, changes of the political environment that induce fiscal responsibility are desirable as they generate a positive responsibility multiplier and reduce spending. However, when the discount factor is high, the same changes induce some legislators to free ride on others' responsibility which may lead to higher spending.