Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DellaVigna, Stefano; Durante, Ruben; Knight, Brian; La Ferrara, Eliana
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Brown University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20150042
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 224-256
• 关键词: media bias; politicians; times

摘要

We analyze a novel lobbying channel: firms shifting spending toward a politician's business in the hope of securing favorable regulation. We examine the evolution of advertising spending in Italy during 1993-2009, a period in which Berlusconi was in power three separate times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We document a significant pro-Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising during Berlusconi's political tenure, especially for companies in more regulated sectors. We estimate that Mediaset profits increased by one billion euros during this period and that regulated firms anticipated sizeable returns, stressing the economic importance of this channel.