One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Do, Quoc-Anh; Nguyen, Kieu-Trang; Tran, Anh N.
• 署名单位: Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20130472
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-29
• 关键词: distributive politics; INDIA; pork; INFORMATION; ELECTIONS; PARTIES; ECONOMY; kenya

摘要

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.