Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gagliarducci, Stefano; Manacorda, Marco
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20170778
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 67-95
• 关键词: private returns; CORRUPTION; relatives

摘要

This paper studies the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. Using data for Italy spanning more than three decades on a sample of almost one million individuals plus data on the universe of individuals holding political office, we show that politicians extract significant rents, in terms of private sector jobs, for their family members. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that this phenomenon is a form of corruption, i.e., a quid pro quo exchange between firms and politicians, although arguably an inferior substitute for easier-to-detect modes of rent appropriation on the part of politicians.