The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mehmood, S. U. L. T. A. N.
• 署名单位: New Economic School
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20210176
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 411-445
• 关键词: COURT; incentives; patronage; selection; state; inference; origins; checks; trust

摘要

A central question in development economics is whether there are adequate checks and balances on the executive. This paper provides causal evidence of how increasing constraints on the executive-via removal of presidential discretion in judicial appointments-pro-motes the rule of law. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the termination of presidential dis-cretion in judicial appointments. Overall, the results indicate that presidential appointment of judges deteriorates the rule of law. Even one degree of separation between the judiciary and the president matters. (JEL D72, K40, O17)