How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gonzales, Mariella; Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco; Martinez, Luis R.
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20200482
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 293-326
• 关键词: political responsiveness; turnout evidence; habit formation

摘要

We study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru, leveraging variation from a nationwide reform. A smaller fine has a robust, negative effect on voter turnout, partly through irregular changes in voter registration. However, representation is largely unaffected, as most of the lost votes are blank or invalid. We also show that the effect of an exemption from compulsory voting is substantially larger than that of a full fine reduction, suggesting that nonmonetary incentives are the main drivers behind the effectiveness of compulsory voting.