Unemployment Insurance as a Worker Indiscipline Device? Evidence from Scanner Data

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lusher, Lester; Schnorr, Geoffrey C.; Taylor, Rebecca L. C.
• 署名单位: University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; University of California System; University of California Davis; University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20190007
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 285-319
• 关键词: benefits; duration; DESIGN; LEVEL; time

摘要

We provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of unemployment insurance (UI) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks during the Great Recession to high-frequency productivity measures from individual supermarket cashiers. Estimating models with date and cashier-register fixed effects, we identify a modest but statistically significant negative relationship between UI benefits and worker productivity. This effect is strongest for more experienced and less productive cashiers, for whom UI expansions are especially relevant. Additional analyses from the American Time Use Survey reveal a similar increase in shirking during periods with increased UI benefit durations.